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Prompt injection

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arXiv:2610.38120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) treat all context tokens uniformly, lacking explicit separation between executable instructions and passive data. This leads to prompt injection vulnerabilities, ambiguous instruction binding, and unreliable execution control. We present a post-training methodology using LLMON (LLM

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First observed in our collection
Oct 10, 2026, 6:30 PM UTC
Earliest cited publication
Oct 10, 2026, 12:30 PM UTC
Last observed
Nov 2, 2026, 5:15 PM UTC

Evidence in the last complete seven days

Source mentions
2
Previous seven days 2
Distinct sources
2
Previous 2
Comparable growth
Not comparable
Ranking appearances
0

Collection observations and undated records are separate from dated publication counts. Observed in 7d:2 · Undated records:1

Collection coverage · Limited historyCurrent / previous observed days 7 / 3

Counts use complete UTC days. First observed means first seen by this collection, not when a term was coined.

Current window:2026-10-29 → 2026-11-05 (end excluded) · History 11 days

Observed source coverage by seven-day window
SourceCurrent daysPrevious daysLast success
arXiv63Nov 5, 2026, 10:00 AM UTC
arXiv72Nov 5, 2026, 10:01 AM UTC
Ask HN73Nov 5, 2026, 3:00 PM UTC
Ask HN73Nov 5, 2026, 2:30 PM UTC
Ask HN73Nov 5, 2026, 3:00 PM UTC
Ask HN73Nov 5, 2026, 3:00 PM UTC
GitHub73Nov 5, 2026, 12:15 PM UTC
GitHub Issues73Nov 5, 2026, 10:01 AM UTC
GitHub Releases71Nov 5, 2026, 12:00 PM UTC
GitHub73Nov 5, 2026, 2:30 PM UTC
GitHub Issues73Nov 5, 2026, 10:01 AM UTC
GitHub Releases73Nov 5, 2026, 3:14 PM UTC
GitHub73Nov 5, 2026, 2:30 PM UTC
GitHub Issues73Nov 5, 2026, 10:01 AM UTC
GitHub Releases73Nov 5, 2026, 3:14 PM UTC
GitHub Discovery00Nov 5, 2026, 3:13 PM UTC
GitHub Trending73Nov 5, 2026, 3:14 PM UTC
Google72Nov 5, 2026, 10:00 AM UTC
Hugging Face72Nov 5, 2026, 8:15 AM UTC
Hugging Face Spaces00Nov 5, 2026, 3:13 PM UTC
Hacker News73Nov 5, 2026, 12:45 PM UTC
Hacker News73Nov 5, 2026, 3:30 PM UTC
Hacker News73Nov 5, 2026, 3:30 PM UTC
Hacker News00Nov 5, 2026, 3:13 PM UTC
Show HN00Nov 5, 2026, 3:13 PM UTC
MIT News72Nov 5, 2026, 10:01 AM UTC
OpenAI73Nov 5, 2026, 11:30 AM UTC
Product Hunt73Nov 5, 2026, 12:45 PM UTC
量子位73Nov 4, 2026, 10:15 AM UTC
OpenRouter00Nov 5, 2026, 3:41 PM UTC
Hugging Face Models00Nov 5, 2026, 3:41 PM UTC
HF Daily Papers00Nov 5, 2026, 3:41 PM UTC
OpenRouter00Nov 5, 2026, 3:41 PM UTC
SEC EDGAR73Nov 5, 2026, 10:30 AM UTC
Sequoia Capital72Nov 5, 2026, 10:00 AM UTC
Simon Willison00Nov 5, 2026, 3:13 PM UTC
TechCrunch73Nov 5, 2026, 2:30 PM UTC
Contracts Finder73Nov 5, 2026, 10:00 AM UTC
V2EX73Nov 5, 2026, 2:30 PM UTC
  • Counts describe monitored public sources, not the whole web or search demand.
  • Both weeks need adequate, comparable collection coverage.

Daily history · up to 90 days

Bars show dated source mentions. The latest UTC day may be incomplete. Zero mentions and missing collection coverage are different conditions.

2026-10-102026-11-05

Dotted markers indicate days with no record. They are not counted as zero mentions.

View accessible daily data
Daily source mentions and collection observations
UTC dateMentionsSourcesObservationsRanking appearances
2026-10-101110
2026-10-11 · No record————
2026-10-12 · No record————
2026-10-13 · No record————
2026-10-14 · No record————
2026-10-15 · No record————
2026-10-16 · No record————
2026-10-171110
2026-10-18 · No record————
2026-10-191110
2026-10-20 · No record————
2026-10-21 · No record————
2026-10-220000
2026-10-230000
2026-10-240000
2026-10-250000
2026-10-261120
2026-10-271110
2026-10-280000
2026-10-291110
2026-10-300010
2026-10-311100
2026-11-010000
2026-11-020000
2026-11-030000
2026-11-040000
2026-11-050000
Source reference for Post-Training Large Language Models with LLMON. Screenshot not yet available.
Source record · preview pending · arxiv.orgOpen the source for the full page.

Source evidence

Sources in the evidence shown:arXiv 2 · 量子位 1 · Hacker News 4 · GitHub Trending 1

  1. arXiv · Published Oct 31, 2026

    Post-Training Large Language Models with LLMON

    arXiv:2610.38120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) treat all context tokens uniformly, lacking explicit separation between executable instructions and passive data. This leads to prompt injection vulnerabilities, ambiguous instruction binding, and unreliable execution control. We present a post-training methodology using LLMON (LLM

    View source record →
  2. 量子位 · Published Oct 29, 2026

    刚刚,Gemini 4 Carbon全面超越Opus 5.5!首发Token半价

    能连肝数日修Bug,免疫提示词注入

    View source record →
  3. Hacker News · Published Oct 27, 2026

    Blazle – Block prompt injection and secret leaks before AI agents act

    View source record →
  4. GitHub Trending · Published Not supplied

    NVIDIA/SkillSpector

    Security scanner for AI agent skills. Detect vulnerabilities, malicious patterns, security risks, prompt injection, data exfiltration, and supply-chain risks in Claude Code, Codex, and MCP skills before you install them.

    View source record →
  5. Hacker News · Published Oct 26, 2026

    MCP-warden local credential broker so AI agents never see your secrets

    I got tired of pasting GitHub PATs, Stripe keys and DB passwords into Claude Code / Cursor MCP configs. One prompt injection or a leaked chat and they’re gone. So I built mcp-warden — a local-first credential broker for the Model Context Protocol. How it works: • You store the secret once in the OS keychain • You define scoped presets (e.g. github-read, stri

    View source record →
  6. arXiv · Published Oct 19, 2026

    The Model Knows Better: Defending Medical Multi-Agent Systems Against Prompt Injection

    View source record →
  7. Hacker News · Published Oct 17, 2026

    Show HN: AegisKernel – Test prompt injection attacks on AI agents in the browser

    View source record →
  8. Hacker News · Published Oct 10, 2026

    Prompt Injection Detection and Defense Tools for Enterprise AI Agents

    View source record →

Review priority 48 / 100

This score orders research candidates. It is not search volume, a forecast or verified commercial demand.

  • Evidence

    12.7 / 30

    Distinct dated articles or first observations; repeat crawling adds nothing.

  • Publisher diversity

    16 / 25

    Conservative owner grouping; syndicated copies count once.

  • Comparable change

    0 / 20

    Comparable complete weeks only; no percentage from a zero baseline.

  • Recent evidence

    9.1 / 15

    Latest publication or first observation, not repeated fetch time.

  • Name specificity

    9.7 / 10

    Explicit entities and technical concepts outrank ambiguous acronyms.

Limitations and interpretation

  • First observation is a collection milestone, not proof that a word or product is new to the world.
  • Counts describe monitored public sources, not the whole web or search demand.
  • First observed here is not the invention date of a name or idea.
  • Candidates come from public titles, summaries and entity URLs, not verified full-text analysis.
  • Owner grouping is conservative; undisclosed syndication may remain.
  • Undated observations cannot establish publication growth.
  • An established concept or common product name retained as a baseline, not a newly invented term.
  • Both weeks need adequate, comparable collection coverage.
  • Sources behind this term changed or lack a comparable baseline.

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